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关于进一步加强中医药继承发展工作的意见

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关于进一步加强中医药继承发展工作的意见

国家中医药管理局


国中医药发〔2002〕25号
国家中医药管理局印发

关于进一步加强中医药继承发展工作意见的通知

各省、自治区、直辖市卫生厅(局)、中医(药)管理局,局各直属单位:

  为进一步做好中医药继承发展工作,推动中医药现代化进程,在认真调查研究和广泛听取意见的基础上,我局研究制定了《关于进一步加强中医药继承发展工作的意见》,现印发给你们,请结合实际,认真贯彻执行。

             二○○二年五月十五日

关于进一步加强中医药继承发展工作的意见

  为进一步加强中医药继承发展工作,不断推进中医药现代化,切实发挥中医药在我国医疗卫生保健事业中的作用,更好地为人民健康服务,为社会主义现代化建设服务,现提出以下意见。

一、充分认识加强中医药继承发展工作的重要性和紧迫性

  (一)中医药学是我国医学科学的特色,也是我国优秀传统文化的重要组成部分,不仅为中华文明的发展做出了重要贡献,而且对世界文明的进步产生了积极的影响。改革开放以来,在党的中医药政策的正确指引下,中医药事业在努力继承和保持特色的基础上不断创新与发展,取得了令人瞩目的成就,在人民群众医疗卫生保健方面发挥了并且正在发挥着不可替代的重要作用。进一步加强中医药继承发展工作,大力推进中医药现代化,是学习实践江泽民同志“三个代表”重要思想、全面建设有中国特色社会主义卫生事业的根本要求,对于保障人民健康、保护和发展生产力,对于促进经济发展、推动社会进步,对于弘扬民族文化、振奋民族精神,对于繁荣医学科学、丰富世界医学宝库,都具有十分重要的意义。

  (二)当前,经济全球化进程大大加快,现代科学技术突飞猛进,综合国力的竞争日趋激烈;我国加入世界贸易组织,对外开放进入一个新的阶段;适应社会主义市场经济体制要求的各项改革日益深化,城镇医药卫生体制三项改革全面推进,农村卫生改革正在加紧进行;随着人类疾病谱的变化、医学模式的转变以及人类健康观念的改变,传统医药在世界范围内更加受到关注,中医药在世界传统医学中的突出地位和影响逐步扩大。这些新形势、新变化为中医药事业的发展提供了难得的机遇,也提出了严峻的挑战。

  必须看到,尽管近年来在中医药继承发展工作中取得了不少成绩,但是也存在着一些不容忽视的问题,既有继承方面的不足,也有创新方面的不够。一方面,对古典医籍文献、历代名医和当代老中医药专家学术经验整理开发利用相对薄弱,对历史上长期积累下来的一些行之有效的学术思想、诊疗方法等继承应用不够。另一方面,中医药学术发展相对滞后,缺乏重大的理论创新与技术创新;中医药人才培养、科学研究、中医办院模式等方面也遇到了许多新情况、新问题,其中最为突出的问题是在时代发展、科技进步和社会需求不断发生变化的新形势下,如何充分体现中医药的特色和优势,更好地为人民群众健康服务。这些已成为新形势下制约中医药事业发展的关键所在,必须给予足够的重视,采取有力措施加以解决。

二、进一步明确加强中医药继承发展工作的指导思想

  (三)坚持把为人民群众健康服务作为做好中医药继承发展工作的根本宗旨。中医药事业是造福于人民的事业,继承发展中医药关系人民群众的切身利益,体现了党和政府对人民群众的关怀。充分发挥中医药在我国医学科学中的特色和优势,全心全意为广大人民群众提供更加完善的医疗保健服务,是中医药行业实践江泽民同志“三个代表”重要思想的具体体现,是中医药事业改革与发展的总体目标,是做好中医药继承发展工作的根本宗旨。必须始终坚持把最大限度地满足人民群众健康对中医药的需求作为做好中医药继承发展工作的出发点和归宿。

  (四)正确认识和处理好继承与发展的关系。继承是发展的源泉、基础和前提,发展是在继承基础上的突破、提高和超越,创新是继承与发展的辩证统一。继承和发展是实现中医药现代化的基础,创新是实现中医药现代化的根本动力。一方面,必须切实做好中医药的继承工作,主要是认真继承中医药理论的科学内涵,认真继承历代医家在长期医疗实践中不断积累、创造出来的丰富经验,认真继承古往今来在中医药人才培养、科学研究、临床治疗等方面一切行之有效的独具特色的方式方法,加以应用而不致失传。另一方面,必须大力发扬求真务实、勇于创新的精神,勇于和善于根据实践的要求进行创新,做到与时俱进,在继承中发展,在创新中前进,不断吸取现代科学技术的新经验、新思想、新成果,不断丰富和发展中医药理论与实践,始终保持中医药的生机和活力,努力推进中医药现代化。

  (五)坚持把提高中医药防病治病能力作为加强中医药继承发展工作的核心任务。不断提高中医药防病治病能力,既是中医药能否满足人民群众日益增长的医疗保健服务的需要,也是中医药事业持续健康发展的根本要求。因此,必须充分发挥中医药特色和优势,坚持依靠科技进步,加强人才队伍建设,促进中医药理论创新和技术创新,紧紧围绕提高中医药防病治病能力这一核心任务,切实加强中医药继承发展工作。

  (六)坚持实践是检验真理的唯一标准,努力在实践中促进中医药的继承发展。做好中医药继承发展工作,不断推进中医药现代化,既是一个实践认识的过程,也是一项长期而艰巨的任务。中医药继承发展和实现中医药现代化中的问题包括思想认识上的问题,必须也只能通过不断的研究、探索与实践来解决。在具体实践过程中,由于人们不同的知识结构、不同的工作经历,有的在继承传统的方面多做一些,以使中医药的继承工作有所加强,有的在创新方面有所侧重,提出一些中医药发展的新思路新方法;有的从其他学科角度研究中医药,其根本的、共同的目标都是为了发展中医药。因此,必须始终高举团结的旗帜,充分调动各方面的积极因素,充分尊重老、中、青三代中医药人员的主动性和创造性,从实际出发,积极投身于继承发展中医药的伟大实践;必须坚持“百花齐放、百家争鸣”的方针,避免对中医药学术问题的行政干预,对不同学术见解不打棍子、不扣帽子,大力发扬学术民主,创造相互平等、相互尊重、畅所欲言、宽松和谐的学术氛围和开放包容的团队精神,着力营造追求真理、鼓励探索的良好人文环境。

三、当前和今后一个时期加强中医药继承发展工作的重点任务

  (七)加速培养各级各类中医药人才,大力提高中医药队伍的整体素质。热爱中医药事业,牢固掌握中医药基本理论、基本技能、基本方法,是对各级各类中医药人才的共同的基本的要求,也是做好中医药继承发展工作的根本保证。在此基础上,要以社会需求和中医药事业发展的需要为目标,努力培养造就一支结构合理、规模适度、业务精良、德才兼备的中医药人才队伍。其中,要下大力气加快培养一批医德高尚、中医药理论功底深厚、临床疗效好、群众公认的优秀中医临床人才;要重视和加强具有创新能力的中医药学术和技术带头人的培养;抓紧培养一大批农村和城市社区卫生服务所需要的中医药人才;同时也要注意加强中医药管理人才、复合性人才、外向型人才等的培养。继续开展形式多样的在职教育,通过几年的不懈努力,使现有中医药人才队伍结构不断改善,素质明显提高,更好地担负起中医药继承发展的历史重任。

  (八)适应医药卫生体制改革的新形势,切实加强中医医疗机构内涵建设。中医医疗机构是继承发展中医药的主要阵地,是发挥中医药特色和优势,保护和增进人民群众健康的不可缺少的重要力量。要本着“巩固、充实、完善、提高”的原则,切实加强现有中医医院内涵建设,坚持以中医药为主体,突出中医药特色。要集中主要的精力、主要的力量,研究和实践如何运用中医药学术、技术努力为广大人民群众提供优质、便捷、高效、价廉的中医医疗保健康复服务,如何使中医药的特色和优势更好地得到继承并在继承的基础上有所创新。各级中医医院要积极探索有利于中医药特色优势发挥的办院模式。要把中医专科建设作为加强中医医院内涵建设的重要组成部分继续抓紧抓好。重点中医专科要有中医学术水平高的学科带头人和一支结构合理、中医学术与技术水平领先的队伍,要有系统的中医药综合治疗方法和显著的临床疗效。继续加强和不断完善全国示范中医医院建设,总结推广先进的建设思路和经验,充分发挥其在中医医院办院方向、科学管理、运行机制改革等方面的示范带动作用。其中,根据区域卫生规划和人民群众对中医药的需求,着眼于21世纪中医医院的发展,要努力建设一批现代化的、具有专科特色的综合性中医医院。适应农村卫生改革的新形势,继续加强农村中医药工作。充分发挥县级中医医院的龙头和指导作用,探索和建立向农村推广适宜技术的新机制,进一步巩固和扩大农村中医工作先进县,充分发挥其示范带动作用。

  (九)突出重点,采取切实有效的措施,充分利用现代科技方法和手段,力求中医药继承工作取得新的进展。在认真总结以往中医药继承工作经验的基础上,针对中医药继承发展不同时期存在的薄弱环节和实际问题,统筹规划,突出重点,抓出成效。当前和今后一个时期,要着重做好以下几方面的工作:1、大力加强中医药文献的整理、出版工作。要有计划、有步骤地系统整理各历史时期、各学科、各领域有影响的中医药文献资料,陆续刊行出版。各地应重点抓好本区域历史上有较大学术价值的中医药文献的整理出版工作,支持重要典籍文献和著名老中医药专家学术著作的出版。2、对当代名老中医药专家学术思想和临床诊疗经验继续进行系统地总结整理。3、切实加大总结、整理、研究和推广中医独特的临床诊疗技术的力度。要有组织、有计划、有重点地在全国范围内遴选、推广具有明显特色和优势、有显著社会效益和经济效益的中医药新方法、新技术、新成果,促进中医临床疗效的提高。

  (十)大力推进中医药的理论创新和技术创新,加快中医药现代化进程。中医药科技进步是实现中医药现代化的重要保证。中医药科研工作首先要解决中医药科研工作的思路、技术路线和科研方法等问题,既要遵循科学研究的基本精神,强调科研设计的严密性、规范性、逻辑性和技术路线的合理性、可行性,同时也必须注重体现中医药的特点。要系统总结和整理传统中医药研究方法的优势和特点,揭示中医药学与现代医学方法论的不同特点、规律及其优越性,相互借鉴,建立能够真正体现中医药学自身发展规律的科学研究方法。

  中医药科技工作要遵循“有所为,有所不为”的方针,实行有限目标,重点突破。注重基础与临床、理论与应用的有机衔接,形成基础理论研究与临床研究相互促进的良性运行机制。精心组织全国多学科的研究队伍,围绕提高中医药学术水平和防治疾病能力的重大问题,选择重点领域,运用现代科学技术研究方法与传统中医药研究方法相结合,积极开展对中医药理论、中医临床有重大推动作用的学术研究工作。

  强化中药应用技术的研究与开发。面向中医临床需要和中药生产实际,面向社会需求,研究解决影响行业发展的重大或关键技术问题。要努力建立和完善我国现代中药研究开发体系,切实加强中药产业化的基础性研究工作和中药制药关键技术的基础性研究,尽快形成体现中医药理论特点并逐步获得国际认可的现代中药标准规范体系。坚持开发与引进相结合,大力引进关键技术,注重高新技术的消化吸收,使中药产品更好地满足中医临床的需要,并逐步增强我国中药在国际医药市场上的竞争力。

  (十一)认真研究并大力加强中西医结合工作。中西医结合是继承和发展中医药学的重要途径之一,是沟通中西医学、促进中医药走向世界的重要桥梁。在过去的几十年里,中西医结合工作者对中医药学的发展和中国医药事业的进步,做出了突出贡献。现阶段,要认真总结经验,积极推动中西医结合工作,充分发挥中西医结合的学科优势,要从临床入手,抓住临床重大及难治性疾病防治的关键问题,加强中西医结合的基础及临床的系统研究。注重中西医结合中方法学等问题的研究,以促使中西医结合工作步步深入。通过多种形式和途径,加速中西医结合人才特别是高级人才的培养,继续鼓励西医学工作者特别是高年资的西医师学习和研究中医药。大力扶持一批中西医结合重点专科,不断提高中西医结合临床疗效。

  (十二)积极发展民族医药。我国各少数民族医药是祖国传统医药学的重要组成部分,为各民族繁荣昌盛做出了重要贡献。要按照分类指导的原则,对理论体系比较完整的民族医药,在继续挖掘整理的基础上,努力提高其标准化、规范化水平;对其他民族医药,重点是做好有效方药和诊疗技术的挖掘整理工作。加强对民族医药文献的整理与翻译,继续做好《中国民族医药志》的编写工作。注重对民族药的开发及生产关键技术的基础研究,积极开展适合民族药特点的制药设备、技术及剂型的研究,建立和完善民族医药制剂规范和质量控制标准,促进民族医药学和医药产业的发展。注重民族医药学的教育及人才培养工作。进一步加强和完善民族医院和民族医专科的建设。

  (十三)进一步促进中医药的国际交流与合作,推动中医药更广泛地走向世界。我国加入世界贸易组织,为做好中医药继承发展工作提供了更加广阔的空间和更加有利的条件,也带来了新的机遇和挑战,必须抓住这一契机,加强中医药的国际交流与合作,促进中医药的继承发展。要加强对世贸组织规则以及中医药知识产权保护、中医药国际化运作机制的研究,继续坚持“立足国内、以内促外,依靠科教、医药并举,因地制宜、双向接轨”的战略方针,不断巩固和开拓民间渠道,重视和加强与各国政府和国际组织间的交流与合作,努力形成全方位、多层次、宽领域的中医药对外交流与合作格局,不断提高中医药国际交流与合作的质量、水平和层次,推动中医药更广泛地走向世界。

四、进一步加强中医药继承发展工作的相关措施

  (十四)充分认识和遵循中医药人才成长的规律,把院校培养与在职教育有机地衔接起来。在中医药教育结构调整、指导性教学计划和人才培养标准制定等方面,配合教育行政管理部门,积极引导各级各类中医药院校在认真总结办学经验与教训的基础上,深化中医药院校教育教学改革,尽快改变当前中医药基础理论、经典著作和中医临床教学环节薄弱的现象,为学生树立牢固的专业思想、打下扎实的中医药基本功底奠定良好基础。进一步加强中医药教材建设,强化中医药基本理论知识教学和基本功训练,并用中医药学术新进展和现代科学技术新成果充实和更新教育内容。积极发展七年制和研究生教育,逐步开展非医学专业毕业生直接攻读中医研究生学位试点工作。进一步加强中医药院校师资队伍建设,从事中医临床教学的教师应当具备执业中医师资格,并保证有一定时间从事中医临床实践;有关高等中医药院校应当为从事中医药教学工作的教师提供必要的中医临床实践条件。认真执行《执业医师法》,调整中医执业医师考试科目,增加中医理论与临床考试科目和内容,加强中医临床实际操作能力考核,使中医执业医师的中医临床能力与其所获执业资格相符合。

  (十五)逐步建立中医药专业技术人员终身教育制度。大力开展以学习中医药基本理论知识和技能、名老中医药专家诊疗经验和中医药学术新进展为主要内容的继续教育,采取多种形式和途径,巩固和提高不同学历层次、不同知识结构、不同职称的中医药人员的业务素质。加强中医药继续教育内容的教学指导,规范各级各类中医药专业技术人员培训目标和要求,把参加继续教育情况同执业注册、职称评定和职务聘任等工作紧密结合起来。全面推进中医住院医师规范化培训,并做好与临床专业学位的衔接。开展对全科医师和乡村医生中医药知识和技术的培训,提高他们运用中医药的能力,发挥中医药在农村和城市社区医疗卫生服务中的作用。

  近年来开展的名老中医药专家学术思想和技术专长经验继承工作,不仅抢救、保存和继承了一批老中医药专家的宝贵经验,而且有利于培养具有流派特色和技术专长的高层次中医药人才,要在认真总结经验的基础上,进一步完善和落实相关政策,继续推行。中医名医是一个时期中医药学术和临床疗效水平的主要体现者、继承者和发扬者,是中医药事业的宝贵财富。要在全社会形成尊重名医、爱护名医的良好环境,为他们的工作和生活提供有利条件,注重发挥他们在提高中医药防病治病能力、培养中医药人才等方面的作用。

  (十六)积极推进中医医疗机构管理体制和运行机制改革,为中医药的继承发展创造良好的体制环境。各地应根据本地区社会、经济发展状况和居民医疗需求,在区域卫生规划中合理安排中医医院的设置和布局。要根据历史和现实的状况,加大对现有中医医院的建设力度。要从中医医院的特点出发,认真落实好医疗卫生体制改革中对中医药的各项政策,积极推动公立中医医院的管理体制和内部运行机制改革。在办好政府举办的非营利性中医医院的同时,要鼓励社会组织和个人举办非营利性或营利性中医医疗机构,在严格审核的基础上,适当放宽在农村和城市社区兴办中医医疗机构的限制。各级中医药行政管理部门要加强对各类中医医疗机构的指导和监督,认真审核其办医资格和条件,规范其医疗服务行为。

  (十七)大力深化中医药科研体制改革。建立以优秀人才为核心、开放流动竞争协作的科研运行机制和与之相适应的激励机制,充分调动和发挥中医药科研人员的积极性和创造性。建立科学的评审指标体系和公开、公平、公正的科研评估机制。加强中医药科研相关条件的建设,通过重点中医药研究室(实验室)、重点中医专科和中医药重点学科的紧密结合,形成中医药学术发展的整体合力。改革科研经费的投入和管理方式,集中力量支持中医药继承发展中的战略性、全局性和关键性问题的研究,力争取得在国内外医学科学领域有显示度的重要突破。发挥市场和社会需求对中医药科技进步的导向和推动作用,支持和鼓励中医医疗机构、中药企业从事中医药的科研、开发和技术改造。在中医药科技工作中要鼓励创新、竞争和合作,鼓励走医教研结合、产学研结合、中医中药结合、基础与临床结合的道路,鼓励跨行业、跨学科、跨领域的交流与合作。

  (十八)推进中医药法制化、标准化、规范化建设,依法保障中医药的继承与发展。加紧制订国家中医条例,逐步完善国家中医药立法。积极推动地方中医药法规建设,创造中医药发展的良好法制环境。认真研究制定和完善中医师、中医医疗机构准入条件和技术标准规范。加强中医行业管理与执法工作,加大对盗用中医名义的各种非法行医行为的打击力度,维护中医医疗市场的秩序和中医药行业的良好声誉。

  坚持依法治业与以德治业相结合,切实加强行业精神文明建设。高尚的医德、廉洁的医风是中医药文化内涵的重要组成部分,也是中医药继承发展的重要内容。仁爱救人、淡泊名利、博采众长、谦和谨慎等优良的传统职业道德在中医药行业中源远流长。我们要把继承和发扬中医药行业优良传统道德与社会主义精神文明建设紧密结合起来,引导和教育广大中医药工作者始终坚持“以病人为中心”,树立“救死扶伤、忠于职守,爱岗敬业、满腔热忱,开拓进取、精益求精,乐于奉献、文明行医”的行业风尚,为振兴中医药事业而努力奋斗。

  (十九)进一步做好中医药科学普及工作。要从弘扬优秀传统文化,加强爱国主义教育的高度,通过新闻出版、影视音像等各种传播媒介和途径,努力在全社会中宣传党的中医药政策,宣传中医药的科学性以及在保障人民群众健康方面的地位、作用和优势。各中医药院校、中医药研究机构、中医医疗机构及有关学术团体,都应将以各种形式宣传、普及中医药科学知识视为己任,为做好中医药的继承发展,推进中医药现代化奠定更加坚实的群众基础。

  (二十)切实加强对中医药继承发展工作的领导。加强中医药继承发展工作,不断推进中医药现代化是一项规模宏大、任务繁重的系统工程,必须用改革的精神、创新的思路去加以实施。各级中医药行政管理部门必须充分认识做好这项工作的重要性、紧迫性,统一思想,切实转变职能,转变工作作风,努力提高工作水平。各地要按照加强中医药继承发展工作的指导原则、重点任务和基本要求,紧密结合本地实际,制定切实可行的工作计划,精心组织实施,并认真研究、解决继承发展工作中的薄弱环节和工作中出现的新情况、新问题。要加强调查研究,坚持分类指导、示范先行的工作方法,及时掌握有关情况,总结推广成功经验。要主动争取各级党委、政府对加强中医药继承发展工作的关心与支持,积极协调好计划、财政、教育、科技等有关部门通力合作,广泛动员社会力量,加大投入,为中医药的继承发展和推进中医药现代化创造良好的政策和社会环境。


Student:Dayong Zhou

dayong_77@hotmail.com


The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China

周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)

Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete

Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.

国务院办公厅关于批准衡阳市城市总体规划的通知

国务院办公厅


国务院办公厅关于批准衡阳市城市总体规划的通知
国办函〔2006〕94号

湖南省人民政府:
  你省《关于审批〈衡阳市城市总体规划(2002-2020)〉的请示》收悉。经国务院同意,现通知如下:
  一、原则同意修订后的《衡阳市城市总体规划(2006年-2020年)》(以下简称《总体规划》)。
  二、衡阳市是湖南省南部的中心城市。要以科学发展观为指导,坚持经济、社会、人口、环境和资源相协调的可持续发展战略,统筹做好衡阳市城市规划、建设和管理的各项工作。按照合理布局、集约发展的原则,有重点地发展现代加工业、物流业和旅游业,不断完善公共服务设施和城市功能,把衡阳市建设成为经济繁荣、社会文明、生态良好,具有地方特色的现代化城市。
  三、重视城乡统筹发展。在《总体规划》确定的1114平方公里的城市规划区范围内,实行城乡统一规划管理。以调整、改造、挖潜为主,逐步完善中心城区功能,强化中心城区与周边城镇的经济联系。要按照促进城乡经济社会统筹协调发展的要求,根据市域内不同地区的条件,加强城乡发展统筹规划,重点发展湘江沿岸和京珠高速公路、京广线沿线城镇,逐步形成布局合理、功能明确、结构完善的市域城镇体系,带动农业产业化和农村经济发展。
  四、合理控制城市规模。到2020年,主城区实际居住人口控制在130万人以内,建设用地控制在120平方公里以内。具体规模要与你省省域城镇体系规划和土地利用总体规划相衔接。要根据衡阳市环境、资源的实际条件,强化集约和节约用地,采取切实措施保护好耕地特别是基本农田。充分重视对城市地下空间的开发利用,防止城市规模盲目扩大。
  五、完善基础设施体系。要重视交通基础设施建设,建立公路、铁路、水运和民航相协调的交通运输系统。建立以公共交通为主体,多种交通方式相结合的多层次、多类型的公共客运服务系统。统筹规划建设城市给水、排水和污水、生活垃圾处理等基础设施。充分重视城市防灾工作,加强重点防灾设施和灾害监测预警系统的建设,建立包括消防、防洪、抗震和人防在内的综合防灾系统。
  六、加强资源环境保护。城市发展要走节约资源、保护环境的集约化道路,根据节流、开源、保护并重的原则,节约和集约利用水、能源等资源。要提高水资源利用效率,建设节水型城市。依靠科技进步,大力发展循环经济,强化工业、交通和建筑节能。加强对自然保护区、森林公园、水源地和衡山风景名胜区等特殊生态功能区的保护。坚持经济建设、城乡建设与环境建设同步规划、实施和发展,严格按照规划提出的各类环保标准限期达标。加强城市环境综合治理,严格控制和治理湘江干、支流的水污染。
  七、创造良好人居环境。城市功能要以人为本,创建宜居环境。切实做好关系人民群众切身利益的教育、医疗卫生、市政等公共服务设施的规划布局。将普通商品住房、经济适用住房和廉租住房的建设目标纳入近期建设规划,从方便低收入群体的生活与就业出发,保障经济适用住房和廉租住房用地的分期供给规模、区位布局和相关资金投入。根据城市的实际需要与可能,稳步推进旧城改造特别是危房改造工作。
  八、重视风貌特色保护。要加强对市域内各级文物保护单位和风景名胜资源的保护,划定保护范围,制订保护措施并严格实施。依托湘江、蒸水、耒水等“三水六岸”构建城市滨水景观区,加强滨江带状绿地和城市主要道路两侧绿化带建设,形成与衡山风景名胜区相呼应,富有丘陵地区滨江城市特色的景观风貌。
  九、严格实施《总体规划》。《总体规划》是衡阳市城市发展、建设和管理的依据,城市规划区内的一切建设活动都必须符合《总体规划》的要求。要抓紧深化近期建设规划和有关专业规划,建立健全城市规划、建设和管理的各项制度。城市规划行政主管部门要依法对城市规划区范围内的一切建设用地与建设活动实行统一、严格的规划管理,切实保障规划的实施。驻衡阳市的各单位都要遵守有关法规及《总体规划》,支持衡阳市人民政府的工作,共同努力,把衡阳市规划好、建设好、管理好。
  衡阳市人民政府要根据本通知精神,认真组织实施《总体规划》,任何单位和个人不得随意改变。你省和建设部要加强对《总体规划》实施的指导、监督和检查工作。
                            国务院办公厅
                          二○○六年十一月十七日